Here’s the “Key Highlights” from this Cooley Alert penned by Brad Goldberg, Ali Murata, Beth Sasfai, Michael Bergmann, Amanda Weiss and Michael Mencher:
“NEOs would be limited to the CEO and CFO. The proposal would limit the NEOs to individuals who served as principal executive officer (PEO) or principal financial officer (PFO) during the last completed fiscal year, reducing the number of NEOs from the current five or more (three or more, in the case of SRCs and EGCs) to two in most circumstances.
Scaled disclosure for SRCs and EGCs would largely continue. The proposal would preserve the nature of the existing scaled disclosure accommodations, but SRCs and EGCs would provide disclosure for two NEOs (PEO and PFO) in most circumstances, rather than three or more, and would be required to include the same three new tables as large filers. SRCs and EGCs would continue to be exempt from compensation discussion and analysis (CD&A) and pay ratio disclosure, and EGCs would continue to be exempt from pay-versus-performance and golden parachute disclosure.
The existing compensation tables would be eliminated or replaced. The proposal would replace the current primary tabular framework, including the Summary Compensation Table and the three equity and plan-based incentive compensation tables, with three new tables: Earned Compensation Table; Granted Compensation Table; and Status of Equity Awards Table. The new tables are designed to distinguish compensation opportunities from amounts actually earned and make equity awards easier to track over their life cycle. In addition, the proposal would eliminate the Pension Benefits Table, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Table, and the narrative and tabular disclosure requirements related to the grant of certain equity awards close in time to the release of material nonpublic information currently contained in Item 402(x) of Regulation S-K.
The proposal notes that companies must provide any material information necessary to an understanding of the information provided in the three tables but emphasizes that a company may provide such information in any format it determines to be appropriate, including in a supplemental table, additional columns in an existing table, footnotes to the tabular disclosures or supplemental narrative disclosures.
Perquisite determination and disclosure would be substantially reformed. Under the proposal, the aggregate reporting threshold for perquisites would increase from $10,000 to $150,000 per NEO, and perquisites that qualify as de minimis fringe benefits under Section 132(a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code would be excluded. In addition, companies would have discretion to determine whether a benefit is “integrally and directly related to an executive’s duties” and thus not a perquisite, so long as the determination is reasonable and made in good faith. Finally, the proposal would remove current guidance that identifies particular items as perquisites.
Notably, the proposal retreats from a present position that personal security arrangements are presumptively perquisites and expressly acknowledges that whether any particular security arrangement qualifies as a perquisite is dependent on all the relevant facts and circumstances. The SEC also expressly acknowledges that the benefit of an arrangement to the company and the business purpose behind it may be factors in determining whether an item is integrally and directly related to the executive’s duties and therefore not a perquisite. The proposal also would eliminate the prescriptive aggregate incremental cost to the company valuation requirement and instead allow companies to use any reasonable valuation methodology.
CD&A requirements would emphasize principles-based disclosure. The CD&A disclosure requirement would be limited to three topics: the objectives of the compensation program in relation to corporate strategy; the material elements of compensation and how amounts are determined; and, where applicable, the effect of the most recent say-on-pay vote on compensation policies and decisions. In addition, the 15 illustrative topics would be eliminated.
CEO pay ratio, pay-versus-performance and clawback disclosures would be simplified. For pay ratio, the proposal would limit the population used to determine the median employee to US full-time employees, excluding seasonal and temporary employees, provide that the median employee could be identified once every five years, and align the compensation methodology with the proposed Granted Compensation Table. Under the proposal, no tabular pay-versus-performance disclosure would be required, and the complex compensation actually paid metric currently required to be disclosed would be replaced by the total disclosed in the proposed Earned Compensation Table. In addition, the only performance measure required to be disclosed would be cumulative total shareholder return, and the disclosure would be required to cover only the PEO and PFO and only the prior three years, rather than five years. With respect to clawback disclosure, the proposal would remove the two annual report cover page check boxes and require disclosure only in cases where the recovery of erroneously awarded compensation was required pursuant to the company’s clawback policy, without changing the underlying clawback mechanics.
Director compensation disclosure would be streamlined. The proposal would retain qualitative and quantitative disclosure of material director compensation and amounts earned by individual directors but would make the framework more principles-based and eliminate certain prescriptive presentation requirements and elements that may not reflect typical director compensation programs.
Companies filing long-form registration statements would have up to 120 days to provide prior year executive compensation. The proposal would amend Forms S-1, S-4, S-11, 10 and N-2 so that a company is not required to provide updated Item 402 disclosure for the most recently completed fiscal year until the earlier of the date the company otherwise discloses that information in a filing under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or 120 days after the end of that fiscal year. As a result, companies using long-form registration statements would be able to have those registration statements declared effective without including executive compensation information for the prior fiscal year for up to 120 days after the end of the fiscal year.
Other prescriptive requirements would be reduced or eliminated. The proposal would eliminate the quantitative hypothetical termination and change-in-control payment disclosure, simplify golden parachute disclosure and allow greater use of narrative, and eliminate disclosure requirements concerning compensation risk-management policies and practices.”
Authored by

Broc Romanek